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ing a complaint for an aggrieved client. Moreover, the decision ne-
cessitates that the practitioner should make full use of New York's
liberal pleading system, which allows a plaintiff to pursue alterna-
tive and inconsistent theories of recovery115 and freely permits him
to amend his complaint during the course of litigation. 16
Thomas J. Quigley
Municipal incorporation criteria set by townships are not pre-
empted by Village Law
Comprehensive growth plans document the development strat-
egies of municipalities. 117 Often motivated by drastic population
shifts and correlative problems in pollution, housing, and public
"I' See CPLR 3014, 3017 (1974). CPLR 3014 permits claims to be pleaded inconsis-
tently, alternatively or even hypothetically. Id. This liberality in pleading is premised upon
a legislative recognition that litigation is often unpredictable, and that parties therefore
should be permitted to set forth all arguments which offer a reasonable possibility of suc-
cess. CPLR 3014, commentary at 8 (1974); see, e.g., Abbot v. Page Airways, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d
502, 514, 245 N.E.2d 388, 395, 297 N.Y.S.2d 713, 722 (1969). See also SIEGEL § 214; 3
WK&M $ 3014.11-12. Additionally, CPLR 3017 allows the pleader to demand alternative
and inconsistent forms of relief. See CPLR 3017 (1974).
"o CPLR 3025(b) provides that "a party may amend his pleading, or supplement it by
setting forth additional or subsequent transactions or occurrences, at any time by leave of
court or by stipulation of all parties. Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be
just including the granting of costs and continuances." CPLR 3025(b) (1974).
117 General comprehensive plans represent: (1) a source of information as to economic
activity, population composition, channels of movement and physical resources; (2) a pro-
gram of correction, indicating an area's functional deficiencies; (3) an estimate of the future,
guiding the municipality in promoting general welfare; (4) a clarification of goals and the
type of city the community wants; (5) a technique for coordination; and (6) a device to
stimulate public interest and responsibility. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Con-
stitution, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 353, 356-61 (1955). The enhancement of regional wel-
fare may be accomplished through the use of regional planning mechanisms, such as master
plans, that lodge most decisionmaking power at the local level, subject to standards reflect-
ing area-wide interests. Bagne, The Parochial Attitudes of Metropolitan Governments: An
Argument for a Regional Approach to Urban Planning and Development, 22 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 271, 287 (1978). Master plans have almost been likened to small-scale constitutions
since they require future implementary legislation to be in conformity with the plan's goals.
See Haar, supra, at 357. Professor Haar has objected to the use of the term "master plan"
because it connotes a rigid design or blueprint rather than a flexible working guide. Id. at
354 n.4. The term also may create an exclusive concern with purely physical arrangements
and facilities, thus indirectly leading planners to minimize the plan's social and economic
goals. Id. The terms "developmental plan," "long range comprehensive plan," or "general
community plan" are preferred by the planning community. Id.
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transportation,"1 8 these plans have been praised widely for their
emphasis upon general regional welfare.119 Nonetheless, several
cases have inquired into the validity of ordinances intended to fa-
cilitate the execution of growth plans.120 In this regard, a question
has arisen as to whether the Village Law precludes a locality from
enacting requirements for municipal incorporation in order to pre-
serve its comprehensive plan.' Recently, in Marcus v. Baron,122
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a local law
enacted to effectuate a locality's comprehensive plan was not pre-
empted by the Village Law.12 3
In Marcus, the Ramapo Town Supervisor conducted a hearing
to assess the adequacy of a petition for the incorporation of the
Village of Wesley Hills.124 The supervisor determined the petition
Il8 Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 374, 285 N.E.2d 291, 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
149 (1972); see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
119 See Alterman, Decision-Making in Urban Plan Implementation: Does the Dog Wag
the Tail, or the Tail Wag the Dog?, 3 URB. L. & POL'Y 41, 44-45 (1980); Bagne, supra note
117, at 287; Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154,
1175 (1955); Haar, supra note 117, at 361; Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehen-
sive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899, 972 (1976); Mandelker, Standards
for Municipal Incorporations on the Urban Fringe, 36 Tax. L. REv. 271, 289 (1958).
120 See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 601, 557 P.2d
473, 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51 (1976); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622,
132 N.W.2d 687, 689-91 (1965); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 365-83, 285 N.E.2d
291, 293-305, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 141-56 (1972); Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Town of Caledonia, 72 App. Div. 2d 957, 958, 422 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250-51 (4th Dep't 1979).
121 See Marcus v. Baron, 106 Misc. 2d 71, 73-74, 431 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (Sup. Ct. Rock-
land County 1980), rev'd, 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1981). "Incorpo-
ration" describes the prescribed set of legal acts which enable a municipality to be brought
into existence. 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 12 (1949). The net effect of incorporation
is to impose a legal division between the incorporated area and the surrounding region. Id. §
114. A township, therefore, has no legal right to legislate for a municipal corporation located
within its borders concerning any matters involving the police power. Id. The ordinances
and regulations of the township have no binding force on the incorporated villages within
the township limits. Id.
122 84 App. Div. 2d 118, 445 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1981).
123 Id. at 124, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
124 Id. at 122-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 592. Sections 45.4 to 45.7 of Ramapo Local Law No. 3
provide for a hearing before the town supervisor regarding the petition for incorporation,
the submission of a report concerning the application by the town supervisor to the Ramapo
Town Board, a meeting of the town board and a determination based upon the supervisor's
report, and the rendering of a final decision by the town supervisor as authorized by the
town board. Id. at 121, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 591; Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1910
(No. 3). Article 2 of the Village Law, entitled "Incorporation," also contains a provision
requiring a hearing. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-204 (McKinney 1973). Section 2-206 enumerates
certain objections that may be directed to the incorporation application at the hearing, such
as unqualified petition signatories, insufficiencies in the number of signatures, and insuffi-
ciencies with respect to population and territory. Id. § 2-206.
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to be insufficient based upon, inter alia, noncompliance with the
Village Incorporation Law of the Town of Ramapo'25 (Local Law
No. 3), which sets forth municipal incorporation requirements in
addition to those prescribed by the legislature in article 2 of the
Village Law.126 The petitioners, seeking to invalidate the local law,
instituted Article 78 proceedings. 127 Thereupon, the Supreme
Court, Special Term, annulled the supervisor's determination of
insufficiency under Local Law No. 3128 and held that such local law
was preempted by the Village Law. 29
125 See 84 App. Div. 2d at 122-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 592. The town supervisor found that
the incorporation application did not contain allegations that the proposed incorporation
was in the public interest of the territory to be incorporated, the remaining town area, or
any school, fire or other improvement districts wholly or partially within the area to be
incorporated. Id. These allegations were required by section 45.3 of Local Law No. 3, see
Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1910 (No. 3); note 126 infra. In his report to the
town board, the supervisor also alleged an "impermissible reference" in the petition to two
affidavits concerning certification of the number of signatories, the impermissible inclusion
of town property in the proposed incorporated territory, failure to allege the proper legal
basis on which incorporation petitions are to be signed, and the adverse effect of the incor-
poration on the town's controlled growth program, zoning plans, and the public interest. 84
App. Div. 2d at 122-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
12 See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-202 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981-1982). The Town of
Ramapo adopted its master plan in 1966 after a 2-year study of existing land uses, public
facilities, transportation, industry and commerce, housing, and population trends. 84 App.
Div. 2d at 119-20, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 590. In an attempt to safeguard its comprehensive plan,
the town board, in 1967, enacted article 45, section 45.3, of the Town Code, entitled "Village
Incorporation Law of the Town of Ramapo." 84 App. Div. 2d at 121, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 591;
see Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y. Local Laws 1909-10 (No. 3). The Article sets out the follow-
ing incorporation guidelines:
Petition for incorporation.
(a) Every petition for incorporation of a village shall include all the requirements
contained in section [3-302] of the Village Law of the State of New York.
(b) It shall further contain allegations that the proposed incorporation is in the
over-all public interest. (1) Of the territory proposed to be incorporated; (2) Of
the remaining area of the local government in which such territory is located; and
(3) Of any school district, fire district or other district corporation, fire protection
district or town improvement district, situated wholly or partly in the territory to
be incorporated.
Id.
12 84 App. Div. 2d at 119, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
128 Marcus v. Baron, 106 Misc. 2d 71, 78-79, 431 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631-32 (Sup. Ct. Rock-
land County 1980). Special term rejected the town supervisor's findings, see note 125 supra,
stating that there was no dispute as to the signatories' qualifications, that town-owned prop-
erty could be included in the territory proposed to be incorporated since the Village Law
did not prohibit it, and that the Village Law was silent concerning the inclusion of affidavits
in the petition. Id.
129 106 Misc. 2d at 74, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 629. Special term found that the town supervisor
performs a ministerial function in determining an application's compliance with article 2 of
the Village Law, and that to allow him the "all-important discretionary power" to pass upon
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On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed Special Term's invalidation of the supervisor's denial of the
petition under Local Law No. 3, but reversed on the issue of pre-
emption.130 Writing for the majority, Justice Titone31 noted that
absent a clear state intention to "occupy the entire field," 182 local
laws which address subject matter already dealt with by state laws
are not preempted mandatorily. 133 The majority stated, moreover,
that local laws properly may enhance such common subject matter
by providing additional reasonable requirements.13 4 The court ob-
served that when supplemental restrictions are imposed in connec-
tion with a comprehensive growth plan, there is no conflict be-
tween the state and local law, and, therefore, no need for
preemption.1 3 5 Indeed, the court stated that the legislature had not
precluded localities from enacting incorporation criteria supple-
mental to those delineated in general state legislation."' The court
an incorporation's effect on the public interest would be unwise. Id. at 74-75, 431 N.Y.S.2d
at 629-30. Special term also found Local Law No. 3 inconsistent with the Village Law and
that no special circumstances surrounded Ramapo's situation such that Local Law No. 3
could be sustained. Id. at 76, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 630. Noting that the legislature recently had
declined to enact a bill amending article 2 of the Village Law to read substantially similar to
Local Law No. 3, special term inferred a legislative intention to maintain the status quo
with respect to village incorporation. Id. at 76-77, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
130 84 App. Div. 2d at 124-26, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The appellate division concurred
with special term's rejection of the supervisor's findings concerning the "impermissible" affi-
davits, inclusion of town-owned property, and lack of legal signatories. Id. Since the appel-
late division held Local Law No. 3 to be constitutional, however, reversal was necessary due
to the missing allegations required by the law. Id. at 132-33, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
131 Concurring with Justice Titone in the majority opinion were Presiding Justice Mol-
len and Justice Weinstein. Justice Hopkins filed a lone dissent.
132 84 App. Div. 2d at 125, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593. The majority noted that the state's
intention to preempt local action in a given field may be inferred from an elaborate statu-
tory scheme or a determination of state policy. Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. The majority observed that a local law imposing additional reasonable require-
ments merely supplements the general legislation and that equating the constitutional defi-
nition of "inconsistent" with that of "different" "vitiate[s] the flexibility of home rule as
enunciated by the Legislature and the Executive branch in enacting the Municipal Home
Rule Law." Id. (quoting Town of Clifton Park v. C.P. Enterprises, 45 App. Div. 2d 96, 98,
356 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (3d Dep't 1974)). Moreover, the majority noted that a "special local
problem" authorizes passage of a local law which is clearly inconsistent with a general law.
84 App. Div. 2d at 126, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 594. As an indication of the lack of express or
implied state intention to proscribe local action, Justice Titone interpreted article 2 of the
Village Law as providing "minimum" geographical, demographic, and procedural require-
ments, without a "hint or suggestion" that responsible town officials are to be prevented
from considering the adverse effects of incorporation upon comprehensive town plans. Id.
:35 Id. at 126, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
6 Id. at 125-26, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94. As a "complete answer" to the preemption
1982]
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founded this conclusion upon the fact that article 2 of the Village
Law does not expressly proscribe consideration of the deleterious
effects of incorporation upon comprehensive growth plans.3 7 In
further defense of Local Law No. 3, the court referred to the "frag-
mentation of local governing bodies"13 8 resulting from the incorpo-
ration of smaller municipalities within the existing governmental
body.13 9 Justice Titone praised the local law's emphasis upon con-
sideration of regional interests1 40 and concluded that section 272-a
of the Town Law, which empowers towns to "prepare ... a com-
prehensive master plan for the development of the entire area of
the town," legitimizes the use of incorporation criteria as a "proper
zoning technique.' ' 4 1
assertion, Justice Titone pointed to a 1976 amendment to the Municipal Home Rule Law
which expressly empowers a town to amend or supersede any statutory provision of the
Town Law relating to the property, affairs, or government of the town. Id. The amendment
grants a town this power of supersession, subject to legislative prohibition, even though the
Town Law provision is a general law. See MuN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1981-1982). Special term had refused to apply this amendment because Ramapo's
Local Law No. 3 had been enacted in 1967, while the 1976 amendment had not been given
retroactive effect by the legislature. 106 Misc. 2d at 76, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 630. The issue of
retroactivity, however, was deemed irrelevant by Justice Titone, since courts generally must
apply the law extant at time of decision. 84 App. Div. 2d at 133, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 594. The
majority thus argued that the amendment was dispositive of the preemption argument. Id.
"1 84 App. Div. 2d at 131-32, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 594. Article 2 of the Village Law, section
2-208, entitled "Decision as to legal sufficiency of petition," requires merely that "the super-
visor ... shall determine whether the petition complies with the requirements of this arti-
cle." N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-208 (McKinney 1973).
13 84 App. Div. 2d at 132, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
139 Id. Justice Titone stated that incorporation criteria established by expert planners,
see Mandelker, Standards For Municipal Incorporations, supra note 119, at 271, had
largely been incorporated into Ramapo's Local Law No. 3. 84 App. Div. 2d at 132, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 595. The majority also quoted a legislative committee report as stating that
local governments must be sufficiently large and invested with planning authority in order
to provide significant financial support to metropolitan areas. Id.
Moreover, Justice Titone analogized to related fields, such as annexation (citing Board
of Trustees v. Town Bd. of Warwick, 56 App. Div. 2d 928, 928-29, 393 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48 (2d
Dep't 1977)), and merger of two or more villages (citing In re Borough of Eden Park, 158
Pa. Super. 401, 43 A.2d 529, 530 (1975)). 84 App. Div. 2d at 129-30, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
The majority reasoned that in these areas the overall public interest is scrutinized to deter-
mine whether the merging communities form "one harmonious whole." Id.
14 84 App. Div. 2d at 131, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97.
14. Id. at 131-32, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597; see N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1965).
Justice Titone noted the "total anomaly" of ruling that while a town may, by statutory
grant, control subdivision within its territorial limits "with particular emphasis in its unin-
corporated areas," see N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1965), it is helpless against the
erosion of this control by the incorporation of smaller municipalities within the town's
boundaries. 84 App. Div. 2d at 131-32, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597. The majority cited the remarks
of John McAlevey, former Town Supervisor of Ramapo, who stated at the petition hearing
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In dissent, Justice Hopkins argued that the legislature's au-
thority to create municipal corporations is "plenary and exclu-
sive, ' 141 and stressed that if the power to set incorporation criteria
exists at the township level, it is only by "necessary implication"
from the New York State Constitution or the Municipal Home
Rule Law.143 Finding no grounds to infer such power in the consti-
tution or the Municipal Home Rule Law,1 44 Justice Hopkins con-
cluded that the power did not exist. 145 Finally, although conceding
that village incorporation within a town's boundaries might frus-
trate the area's planning and zoning ordinances,146 the dissent con-
that unchecked incorporation would squander the public resources, thwart the capital pro-
gram adopted by the town, and frustrate Ramapo's master plan and zoning ordinance. Id.
142 84 App. Div. 2d at 134, 445 N.YS.2d at 598 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
,41 Id. at 135, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Hopkins, J., dissenting); see N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §
2(c); N.Y. MuN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1981-1982). Justice Hop-
kins pointed out that both the constitution and the Municipal Home Rule Law grant local
governments the power to adopt and amend local laws "not inconsistent with any general
law relating to ... property, affairs or government" of the local government. 84 App. Div.
2d at 135, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). Justice Hopkins remarked also that
the language, "property, affairs or government," found in both the constitution and in the
Municipal Home Rule Law, traditionally favored state power and would not have been used
by the legislature had it intended to subordinate state concerns to local powers. Id. (Hop-
kins, J., dissenting) (quoting Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490,
497, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (1977)).
14 84 App. Div. 2d at 135, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). The state
constitution defines a local government as "a county, city, town or village." N.Y. CONsT. art.
IX, § 3(d)(2). Justice Hopkins inferred, therefore, that the legislature intended to treat the
rights of towns and villages equally. The fact that villages are voluntary corporations cre-
ated by their inhabitants, whereas townships are created by the state for the purpose of
serving as agencies of the state, see note 121 supra, was deemed irrelevant by the dissent. 84
App. Div. 2d at 137, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 600 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). The constitution grants
local governments power to amend and adopt local laws on certain subjects unless the legis-
lature restricts adoption of such a law. N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(c)(ii). Justice Hopkins noted
that none of the delineated powers includes creation of local governments. 84 App. Div. 2d
at 136, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). Since the Municipal Home Rule
Law allows the adoption of local laws not inconsistent with "any general law relating to its
property, affairs or government," and the Village Law is a general law, Justice Hopkins
contended that the required statutory implication was contrary to that espoused by the
township. Id.
115 84 App. Div. 2d at 139, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). In response to
the majority's belief that the amendment to the Municipal Home Rule Law was a satisfac-
tory defense to the charge of unconstitutionality, see note 136 supra, Justice Hopkins ob-
served that the 1976 amendment was inapposite, since it only authorized supersession of the
Town Law, while the general law at issue in Marcus was the Village Law. 84 App. Div. 2d at
136, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
16 84 App. Div. 2d at 139, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (Hopkins, J., dissenting). The dissent
admitted that invalidation of Local Law No. 3 might frustrate the symmetry of the town-
ship's zoning and planning ordinances, thereby hampering orderly development of land and
population. Id. (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
1982]
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cluded nonetheless that an express statutory grant enabling pas-
sage of the local law was necessary. 147
Although the Marcus court based its approval of Ramapo's
Local Law No. 3 upon a policy favoring comprehensive plans148
and upon a skillful skirting of the preemption issue,149 it is submit-
ted that an equally compelling justification for Ramapo's local law
can be found in Article IX of the New York Constitution.150 En-
acted to provide local governments with a liberal measure of home
rule,151 Article IX circumscribes the legislature's powers in matters
concerning the "property, affairs or government" of a local en-
tity.152 It is submitted, in this regard, that the development and
141 Id. (Hopkins, J., dissenting). In dictum, Justice Hopkins noted that if towns were
permitted to adopt laws containing incorporation requirements in addition to those pre-
scribed by the state, it might "inaugurate a parochial resistance by towns to new villages"
and create disuniformity throughout the state. Id. (Hopkins, J., dissenting). The dissent
viewed the state as an arbitrator, resolving conflicts between municipalities rather than al-
lowing "internecine struggles" between them. Id. (Hopkins, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 126, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 594.
14. Id. at 124-26, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 593-94. While the majority's resolution of the preemp-
tion problem does not appear faulty, it is submitted that this issue, due to conflicting and
confusing precedents, could have been resolved in either party's favor. Compare Town of
Clifton Park v. C.P. Enters., 45 App. Div. 2d 96, 98, 356 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (3d Dep't 1974)
(prohibition against laws "inconsistent" with any general law is "a check against local laws
which would contradict or would be incompatible or inharmonious with the general laws of
the State") with Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 17 App. Div. 2d
327, 329, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864-65 (1st Dep't 1962) ("local laws which do not prohibit what
the state law permits nor allow what the state law forbids are not inconsistent"). It is fur-
ther suggested that the Marcus court was correct in allowing the public need for compre-
hensive planning to illuminate its analysis of the preemption problem.
"5 See N.Y. CONST. art. IX.
'8' Holland v. Bankson, 290 N.Y. 267, 270, 49 N.E.2d 16, 17 (1943); Comment, Home
Rule: A Fresh Start, 14 BUFFALO L. Rav. 484, 492 (1964). "Home rule" constitutional
amendments, widely adopted by the states, are designed to grant local governments initia-
tive, at least in areas of local concern, without requiring them to obtain prior permission
from the legislature. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role
for the Court, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 643, 650 (1964). State initiative was deemed desirable in
order to provide a flexible system of change for the community faced with a problem requir-
ing prompt resolution. Id. at 670. In New York, constitutional recognition of the local right
of self-government first surfaced in 1894. See N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894, amended
1938). For the historical progress of the New York home rule provision, see Hyman, Home
Rule in New York 1941-1965: Retrospect and Prospect, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 335, 338-48
(1965); Comment, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1147-48 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Home Rule].
15 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(d)(2). Article IX, section 3, provides that "nothing in this
article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in relation to ... [m]atters other
than the property, affairs or government of a local government." Id. § 3(a)(3); cf. N.Y. STAT.
LOCAL Gov'Ts § 11 (McKinney 1969) (legislature reserves the power to enact any law relat-
ing to a matter other than the property, affairs or government of a local government). The
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effective implementation of comprehensive plans is part of such
"property, affairs or government" of townships. Significantly, Arti-
cle IX also contains the following prescription: "[r]ights, powers,
privileges and immunities granted to local governments by this ar-
ticle shall be liberally construed. ' 153 Surely, this provision, echoed
by the legislature in the Municipal Home Rule Law,154  affords
townships the power to delineate village incorporation criteria, es-
pecially since townships are the governmental units affected most
directly by rampant village incorporation. 55
phrase "property, affairs or government" is traceable to the 1894 state constitution. See
N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894, amended 1938). Early judicial efforts at construction of the
phrase resulted in narrow interpretations. See, e.g., Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 491, 167
N.E. 705, 713-14 (1929); City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 439, 165
N.E. 836, 838-39 (1929). Decrying the courts' specialized reading of the home rule language,
one commentator lamented that "[p]lain words have been given special significance, as
though constitutional provisions were written in code." Richland, Constitutional City Home
Rule in New York, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 313 (1954). It is submitted that the constitutional
phrase "property, affairs or government" should be construed to grant townships authority
to address the difficulties engendered by unwise municipal incorporations, especially in light
of the proven deleterious effect of such incorporations on the general welfare. See D.
MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 3, 19 (1966); cf. Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) ("[wjhile the meaning of constitutional guarantees
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation"). It is
submitted that the "new and different conditions" mentioned in Euclid may serve as a re-
sponse to Judge Lehman's 1929 statement, relied on by the Marcus dissent, that "[ilt may
hardly be doubted that the creation of a new city and the determination of its boundaries
do not relate 'to the property, affairs or government of cities.'" City of New York v. Village
of Lawrence, 259 N.Y. 429, 439, 165 N.E. 836, 838-39 (1929). Moreover, in the Lawrence
opinion, Judge Lehman observed that "[w]here a change in the territorial boundaries of a
city brings in its train substantial change in the city's internal affairs, its property, or its
government, then the problem would have a somewhat different aspect." Id. at 446, 165
N.E. at 841. It is submitted that the incorporation of a village within a township, with its
attendant disruption of the town's zoning plan and tax base, results in such a "substantial
change."
153 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 3(c).
15 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1969). It has been suggested that the
mandate of liberal construction found in the constitution and the Municipal Home Rule
Law abrogates the early restrictive view of municipal power, known as Dillon's Rule. Com-
ment, Home Rule: A Fresh Start, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 484, 490 (1964). Dillon's Rule was
based on the proposition that local governments were creatures of the state, that they ob-
tained their authority from the state, and, therefore, that any question of local authority
was to be narrowly construed against the local entity. 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 237 (5th ed. 1911). For a modern criticism of Dillon's position, see Frug, The City As a
Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1109-15 (1980).
"5 One commentator has noted that although the township is perhaps not the most
effective unit of government in a metropolitan area, given the difficulties inherent in the
present governmental scheme, the greater efficiency of the larger township as opposed to
that of the smaller unit will generally militate against the incorporation. Mandelker, Stan-
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It is submitted, nonetheless, that an express legislative sanc-
tion of village incorporation planning would be appropriate. In-
deed, although Article IX limits the legislature's power in matters
relating to the "property, affairs or government" of local governing
bodies, the state still can legislate in this area by general law.156
Significantly, such laws may be interpreted to preempt local ordi-
nances enacted to facilitate the implementation of comprehensive
plans.157 Moreover, irrespective of the preemption issue, it is evi-
dent that a legislative initiative in the area of village incorporation
would be possessed of several advantages. For instance, uniform
village incorporation standards, susceptible to consistent judicial
review, would be established.15 Additionally, legislative action
would obviate the need for judicial activism. 59 Accordingly, it is
submitted that the following statutory scheme would be enacted:
Model Village Incorporation Law
a. The petition for village incorporation is to be submitted to the
dards for Municipal Incorporations, supra note 119, at 294; see Ramapo, N.Y., [1967] N.Y.
Local Laws 1909-10 (No. 3).
158 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(d)(2); see Toia v. Regan, 54 App. Div. 2d 46, 53, 387
N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (4th Dep't 1976), City of Corning v. Coming Police Dep't., 81 Misc. 2d
294, 298, 366 N.Y.S.2d 241, 246 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1974), aff'd, 49 App. Div. 2d 689,
373 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (4th Dep't 1975). The legislature is empowered "to act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any local government by general law or by special law
only (a) on request of two-thirds of the ... legislat[ure] or on request of" a city mayor in
cases of emergency. N.Y. CONsT. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). The constitution defines a general law as
one "which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties ... all cities, all towns or all
villages," id. § 3(d)(1), and a special law as one "which in terms and in effect applies to one
or more, but not all, counties ... cities, towns or villages," id. § 3(d)(4). The restrictions in
the constitution concerning special laws were meant to prevent interference by the legisla-
ture in the government of localities and to eliminate nonuniformity of laws on a particular
subject. 1 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.33, at 64 (3d. ed. 1973).
157 See note 149 supra.
'58 Home Rule, supra note 151, at 1146.
159 See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972). In Golden, a local ordinance prohibiting subdivisions without a permit or variance,
enacted pursuant to Ramapo's comprehensive growth plan, was upheld in view of the para-
mount importance of land use and planning policy. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 145. The Golden Court upheld the ordinance despite a lack of specific constitu-
tional or statutory authorization for its enactment. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334
N.Y.S.2d at 144. Although judicial action without the benefit of legislative guidance is often,
as in Golden, necessary and beneficial, an early commentator noted the difficulties inherent
in court involvement in municipal affairs, stating that "[tihe process of adjudication is ill
calculated to disclose the administrative and practical implications of [municipal problems]
.... Still another difficulty ... is the fact that judicial construction becomes ... part of
the constitutional language itself. As such it can be altered only by . . . constitutional
amendment or the . . . tribulations of judicial reversal." J. McGOLDRICK, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE-1916-1930, at 310-12 (1933).
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
town supervisor."1 0
b. After a public hearing, at which the merits of the incorporation
petition are to be debated, the town supervisor will submit a rec-
ommendation to the town board, upon which they will pass.
Based on the town board's decision, the town supervisor will pre-
pare a final determination, stating his approval or disapproval of
the petition for incorporation, and setting forth his findings of
fact as to the following factors:
(1) the effect of the incorporation on the interests of the proposed
village's inhabitants;""1
(2) the effect of the incorporation on the interests of the inhabi-
tants of the remaining township area;
1 6 2
(3) the effect of the incorporation on the township's comprehen-
sive growth plan and zoning plan;1 65
(4) the possibility of providing the required services by extending
services provided by the township;'
,60 The desirability of originating the village incorporation process with the town super-
visor, it is suggested, stems from his close association with the town board, which is the
repository of zoning power within the township. See N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261, 263 (McKinney
1965 & Supp. 1981-1982). The supervisor's intimate knowledge of township capabilities
should facilitate evaluating the incorporation's effect. See notes 161-165 and accompanying
text infra.
,1 See VA. CODE § 15.1-967(1)-(3) (1981).
162 Cf. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 711(1) (McKinney 1974) (determination as to whether a
proposed annexation is in the overall public interest). As noted by the Marcus majority,
consideration of the village incorporation's impact on the remaining township area is a con-
comitant to the mandate of section 261 of the Town Law that comprehensive zoning plans
are to apply only outside the limits of incorporated villages or cities. See Marcus v. Baron,
84 App. Div. 2d at 132, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 597; cf. Bennett v. Garrett, 132 Va. 397, 406, 112
S.E. 772, 774-75 (1922) (petition for incorporation denied as against the "general good of the
community").
163 Consideration of the incorporation's effect on the comprehensive plan, it is sug-
gested, is a logical extension of Euclid and Golden, both of which indirectly disapproved of
"natural" growth as harmful to the common interest. In Euclid, the Supreme Court upheld
an ordinance restricting complainant's land to nontrade, noncommercial uses, even though
the natural and expected use of the land was in the commercial and trade area. Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). Similarly, the Golden Court sanc-
tioned the local ordinance as a lawful exercise, under section 261 of the Town Law, of the
town's authority to direct local development, though it might divert such development from
its natural course. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 371, 285 N.E.2d 291, 297, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 146 (1972). It is submitted that the unchecked incorporation of villages within
a township's boundaries is of the species of a "natural" but harmful phenomenon involved
in Euclid and Golden.
64 See VA. CODE § 15.1-967(7) (1981). Upon petition of township residents, the town
board may establish improvement districts to provide the township inhabitants with needed
services. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 190 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1981-1982). The term "improve-
ment district" includes, inter alia, sewer, drainage, water, park, lighting, and refuse and
garbage districts. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 209-a (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1981-1982). See gener-
ally 1 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 156, §§ 3.18(c), at 38.49.
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(5) population and geographical requirements.1"5
c. Should the parties seeking incorporation be dissatisfied with
the town supervisor's determination, an appeal may be brought
before a three-judge panel of the appellate division, which panel
will decide whether the town supervisor's findings as to the above
five factors are meritorious.
166
It is hoped that the legislature will recognize the inadequacy
of present legislation, and will move to bridge the gap between the
public policy need for comprehensive planning and the existing
statutory scheme, which grants municipal corporation status irre-
spective of area-wide problems and concerns.
Ricardo H. Piedra
Negation of factors upon which defendant-psychiatrist's judg-
ment was premised is necessary to establish prima facie case of
medical malpractice
The well-settled principle that a physician may not be held
liable for a mere error in medical judgment is circumscribed by a
patient's corresponding right to receive adequate medical treat-
ment.167 Accordingly, should a physician depart from acceptable
161 See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-200 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1981-1982).
166 Cf. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1981-1982) (providing for
appellate division review of the "overall interest" issue in case of deadlock among the gov-
erning boards of local governments affected by a proposed annexation). In its determination
of the Marcus case, special term expressed reservations as to the wisdom of entrusting such
a "far-reaching" decision to the town supervisor, and praised the provision for appellate
division review in annexation proceedings. Marcus v. Baron, 106 Misc. 2d 71, 75, 431
N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1980).
'67 Absent negligence, a physician will not be liable for mere errors of judgment, pro-
vided that he acts in a bona fide manner after careful medical examination. Pike v.
Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (1898); Paradies v. Benedictine Hosp., 77
App. Div. 2d 757, 759, 431 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (3d Dep't 1980); Cohen v. State, 51 App. Div.
2d 494, 496, 382 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (3d Dep't 1976), afl'd, 41 N.Y.2d 1086, 364 N.E.2d 1134,
396 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); DeFalco v. Long Island College Hosp., 90 Misc. 2d 164, 170, 393
N.Y.S.2d 859, 863 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1977); Whitree v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 707-08,
290 N.Y.S.2d 486, 501-02 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Accordingly, a physician will not be held liable for
pursuing an alternative medical procedure which is both proper and acceptable practice.
Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Medical Center, 53 App. Div. 2d 476, 480, 385 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775
(Ist Dep't 1976); Schreiber v. Cestari, 40 App. Div. 2d 1025, 1026, 338 N.Y.S.2d 972, 974 (2d
Dep't 1972); Gielskie v. State, 10 App. Div. 2d 471, 474, 200 N.Y.S.2d 691, 694 (3d Dep't
1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 834, 175 N.E.2d 455, 216 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961); Hirschberg v. State, 91
